In the past two decades there has been a burgeoning of information on governmental terror and the abuse of internationally recognized human rights in countries around the globe (see Cain, Claude, and Jabine 1992).1 While the development of theories to explain why, and to predict when, such crimes will be committed would seem to be a vital undertaking, social science scholars have only begun to use the newly developed information toward this end. To date only a few studies have attempted to construct and test theories seeking to explain variations in the levels of repression found in countries around the world (Henderson 1991 (Henderson , 1993 We seek to build upon the strengths of existing empirical studies on this question, while improving upon them in several respects. We therefore construct a model of the most dramatic form of repression-repression of personal integrity rights-that tests several hypotheses suggested by previous studies, but goes on to test hypotheses suggested by theories not considered in previous empirical work on repression. The data set we employ clearly represents the most comprehensive yet analyzed in a global study of national human rights practices in terms of the number of countries and years it covers, as it includes relevant characteristics and behaviors for a pooled cross-sectional time-series sample of 153 countries for the eight years 1980-87.
RESEARCH ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND REPRESSION
Recent years have seen the publication of several empirical studies relating to human rights, but the tendency has been to focus on human rights practices as an independent variable, specifically as a determinant of foreign policy outputs.2 The first studies that sought to explain variations in human-rights-related phenomena apparently were conducted by Cohan (1975, 1976) , who analyzed the general policy performance of military, as compared to civilian, regimes. For the period 1951-70, McKinlay and Cohan (1975) compare the performance of their two types of regimes with respect to a number of "political variables" relevant to human rights-the proportion of regime-years in which constitutions were declared not in full force and the proportions in which assemblies, political parties in general, or the Communist party were banned. Their statistical analyses demonstrated that poor regimes were more likely than richer ones-and military regimes more likely than civilian ones-to ban constitutions, assemblies, and parties.
McKinlay and Cohan's work was accomplished before Amnesty International, the U.S. Department of State, or Freedom House had begun to publish their assessments of human rights performance annually and with worldwide coverage. More recently, spurred by increasing public and scholarly interest in human rights issues, a few studies have appeared that seek to explain the variations in these more general assessments of regime performance in human rights. In a brief article, Park (1987) reports statistically significant positive relationships between political rights, evidently measured by inverting the Freedom House civil political rights index, and a physical quality of life index, urbanism, welfare expenditures, ethnic diversity, and percent Christian population. He reports statistically significant negative relationships for political rights with military expenditures, education expenditures, and percent Muslim population and no relationship for inequality and political rights.
Ambiguities in Parks discussion of measurement procedures and the bivariate and essentially atheoretical nature of his statistical analyses make us wary of the relationships that he found. Nevertheless, A final difficulty for those who wish to draw inferences from this literature is that the analysts employ four different dependent variables to measure respect for human rights or governmental coercion: formal measures of the effectiveness of representative institutions Cohan 1975, 1976 ), a Freedom House rating (Park 1987 ), a rating derived from an Amnesty International report , and a rating derived from a State Department report (Henderson 1991 (Henderson , 1993 .
We shall construct a model to test hypotheses suggested by contending theories of state terrorism and human rights abuse. A first necessary step toward that end is to define what we mean by these terms and to operationalize them using available measurement techniques.
DEFINING AND MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE TERRORISM
The problem of measuring human-rights-related concepts has received much attention in recent years. The problem of finding a consensual measure of any such concepts is likely an impossible one, due to inevitable disagreements regarding values and definitions (e.g., Van Dyke 1973). We believe, however, that researchers should carefully define the terms and describe the operationalizations adopted, in order to minimize confusion and enhance replicability.
We shall focus on the subset of human rights categorized as dealing with the "integrity of the person" (see Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Henderson 1991, 1993; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Stohl and Carleton 1985) . We also refer to violations of these rights as instances of state terrorism, which, consistent with Gurr (1986), we consider to be a category of coercive activities on the part of the government designed to induce compliance in others. Examples of such activities include murder, torture, forced disappearance, and imprisonment of persons for their political views.
Our adoption of these definitions is not meant to suggest that components of broader definitions of human rights-including rights economic, political, or social in nature-are unfounded or that they are unimportant. We simply focus our current efforts on the integrity of the person because we believe governments abusing this right are committing the most egregious and severe crimes against humanity and that these violations are of the sort that can usually be avoided.4 Further, limiting the term to this category of rights allows us to separate the concept of human rights from related concepts (e.g., democracy, economic standing) that may be, or have been, linked theoretically with national propensities to respect human rights (e.g., Henderson 1991 Henderson , 1993 Mitchell and McCormick 1988) .
Even after we specify the subset of human rights with which we are dealing, difficulties with measure-ment of the concept remain to be solved. The evolving consensus among researchers is that the development of better data sources would be helpful but that sufficient data have been developed to begin the theory building and falsification enterprise, through the use of empirical tests.5
We have chosen to adopt the standards-based approach, as opposed to the events data approach described by Stohl and his colleagues (Lopez and Stohl 1992; Stohl et al. 1986 ).6 Fortunately, relatively recent developments in the collection of data on human rights offer us measurement alternatives that fit our purposes well. Two groups of researchers have applied similar sets of standards, each placing countries on five-point ordinal human rights scales, according to their reading of human rights information sources. Mitchell Following the practice in several of the Stohl studies, parallel analyses are conducted with the two indicators. This provides us with a check against nonvalid findings that might arise due to biases in either indicator, an advantage not found in previous studies explaining variations in human rights behavior. Where the results gained with the two indicators are similar, we can be more confident that our findings are not due to biases in the measures but are, in fact, "real".'
BUILDING A MODEL OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
Now that we have defined and operationalized the dependent phenomenon, we shall outline the theoretical perspectives on repression from which we draw the hypotheses that we shall test. Having outlined the theoretical justification for testing an hypothesis, we then specify how each of the key concepts is operationalized in our model.
Democracy
That democracy ought to decrease governmental resort to terrorism is strongly argued by Henderson: "The democratic process, with its emphasis on bargaining and compromise, offers a meaningful alternative for handling conflict if leaders choose to use it. Democracy should not be viewed as an idealistic process, but as a realistic way to accommodate demands with a minimum of conflict .... With a large measure of democracy, conflict should not grow so sharp as to invite repression" (1991, 123-24). Henderson goes on to note that democracy "cannot be based on pseudoparticipation. There must be legitimate channels, such as political parties and elections, that can carry interests forcefully into government" (p. 124).1o
The dampening effect of democracy on conflict surely does not represent the only way in which it inhibits repression. Effective democracy also provides citizens (at least those with political resources) the tools to oust potentially abusive leaders from office before they are able to become a serious threat. In addition, the freedoms that are essential to proce-dural democracy may make it easier for citizens and opposition leaders to publicize attempts at repression, thereby bringing down on would-be abusive leaders the weight of majority or world opinion.
While the arguments relating democracy to human rights are strong, there can be a problem of tautology when one tries to put democracy and human rights abuse into an independent-dependent variable relationship. Certain minority and procedural rights are normally regarded as elemental features of a democratic form of government. If the rights that must be respected in a democracy are defined very broadly, they may well merge imperceptibly into the respect for human dignity that is, by definition, antithetical to the use of state terrorism.11 If democracy is to function as an independent explanation for state terrorism and abuse of personal integrity, it must be defined in terms of procedures and rights that do not themselves preclude repression, even though they may represent considerable respect for human rights other than those most closely related to the integrity of the person. In addition, if we are empirically to examine the relationship between democracy and repression, democracy must be defined in terms that allow independent operationalization of the concept for the sample of nations we analyze.
For a theoretical definition of democracy, we turn to the work of Bollen, who, after surveying the definitions of a number of leading democratic theorists, defines political democracy as "the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized" (1980, 372). Since power is no more easily operationalized than democracy, Bollen follows the lead of other theorists in noting the crucial role of political liberties and in seeing elections as mechanisms that "may increase the power of the nonelite." If they are to increase the power of the nonelite, elections must be fair, allow choice, be based on a universal franchise, and have results that are "binding on all parties": "Political liberties refer to the rights of all individuals and groups to protest or support-freely-government policies and decisions." These "provide additional political power for the nonelite, allowing them to organize opposition to the elites and their policies" and include free speech, free press, and freedom of opposition (p. 372).12
Two measurement alternatives suggest themselves as useful indicators for the concept of democracy as it has been defined. These are the measure of democracy used by Vanhanen (1990) What is worse, government may resort to repression as a coping mechanism" (1993, 8) .
A large population may increase the occurrence of state terrorism in at least two ways. First, a large number of people increases the number of occasions on which such coercive acts can occur. As a matter of simple probability, such an increase should lead to the occurrence of more instances of coercion. Second, a large population places stress on national resources and bring the threat of environmental deterioration, further reducing available resources (ibid).
Arguments made by Henderson indicate that rapid population growth may also promote resource stress, perhaps even more than population size: "The extent of scarcity varies from country to country, but in the more hard-pressed countries, burgeoning demands will keep governments off-balance and will incline them to resort to repression. Growing populations absorb any economic growth rate that may occur, thus frustrating governments' efforts" (1993, 4). Rapid population growth also increases the proportion of the population falling into the youngest age categories that require the constant creation of new jobs, new housing, and many other government services, as well as posing the greatest tendency to engage in criminal activities and other threats to public order (ibid. and the sources cited therein).
To operationalize the effects of population on the abuse of personal integrity through state terrorism, we employ two variables: the natural logarithm2" of total national population and the average percent increase in national population from one year to the next, over the eight-year period of the study.22
Level of Development and Economic Growth
Despite the use of different indicators for both independent and dependent variables, the research we have summarized uniformly found a negative relationship between level of economic development or wealth and repression (Henderson 1991 The presumed effects of economic growth are more problematic. On the one hand, it is logical to assume that rapid economic growth, since it expands the resource base, should reduce the economic and social stresses that lead governments to use terrorism as a policy tool. But there has also been a strong argument that rapid economic growth is most likely to be a destabilizing force that will, in fact, increase instability and a regime's temptation to resort to coercive means to maintain control. (Olson 1963 is the seminal work.) The destabilizing effect of rapid growth may occur because it can rarely be rapid enough to outstrip the growth in expectations that is simultaneously occurring (Gurr 1970 (Gurr , 1986 ); because it increases the number of declasse individuals and groups most prone to promote instability (Olson 1963) ; or because rapid growth inevitably occurs unevenly, possibly even creating growth by decreasing the well-being of the nonelite. In any case, frequently sharpening class differences within the population cause the elite to promote repression to keep the nonelite quiet (Henderson 1991, 126 and the sources cited therein).
We thus expect abuse of the right to personal integrity to be decreased by level of economic development but increased by economic growth. When we turn to operationalizing economic development and growth, we find some controversy over how these variables ought to be measured. Dissatisfaction with the defects of the most traditional of indicatorsgross national product (GNP) per capita-has led to the development of several alternative measures of economic standing.23 The major problem with these alternatives is that they do not exist-and cannot easily be created-for most of the years, or for a significant number of the countries, of our study. As a result we follow Mitchell and McCormick (1988) and Cohan (1975, 1976 ) in using GNP per capita and percentage growth in GNP per capita as our measures of economic development and economic growth. Despite the deficiencies in these measures, we have little reason to believe they produce inaccurate or misleading results compared to those achievable with other currently unavailable alternatives.
Leftist Regimes
The argument of former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979) Even so, critics of U.S. foreign policy have taken Kirkpatrick and the State Department to task for what the critics see as their efforts unfairly to paint all socialist regimes with the tar of repression. We test the hypothesis that leftist regimes will be more coercive than other regimes, where leftist regimes are defined quite precisely as those governed by a socialist party or coalition that does not allow effective electoral competition with nonsocialist opposition.
Military Regimes
That we expect military regimes to be more coercive than others probably surprises no one, whether they are familiar with McKinlay and Cohan's findings or not. Military juntas are based on force, and force is the key to coercion. Yet, in many of the nations in which soldiers forcibly take power, they do so alleging that the leaders they are replacing were themselves violating the constitution and, possibly, engaging in repression of the rights of the citizens. In addition, since military rule is by definition antithetical to democracy, it might be that any apparent relationship between military rule and state terrorism is spurious, a result of a failure to control for the democratic/nondemocratic nature of the regime.
For our operationalization of military-controlled regimes, we use a classification created under our direction by Madani (1992) This is certainly not the place to review the efficacy of political cultural explanations of national political behavior. At their best, they connote that certain attitudes inculcated by the culture, but not directly measured, are partially responsible for differences in the dependent behaviors of interest. That is the direct implication of Mitchell and McCormick's argument, and, following their lead, we include "British cultural influence" in our models of state terrorism. British influence is therefore represented in our model by a variable coded 1 for countries that had been territo-ries of Great Britain at some point during their histories, which all other countries coded 0.
International War Experience
In their study of economic summitry, Putnam and Bayne (1987) draw on game theory to illustrate that when regime leaders ascend to power, they face the prospect of playing simultaneously in two distinct but nevertheless interrelated games: one is played in the domestic political arena, with the primary purpose is to keep power, whether through election or the use of terror; the other takes place in the international realm, with other major players being the leaders of other countries, their representatives, and relevant international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. We believe that this analogy is also useful to researchers interested in explaining human rights abuse. The fact that these two games are intimately intertwined suggests that leaders' actions in the domestic political realm will likely be affected when their nations are a direct participant in an international crisis situation. In fact, studies of what Stohl (1980) has called the "nexus of civil and international conflict" abound, and the results of some systematic empirical studies (e.g., Stohl 1975 Stohl , 1976 tend to point to the conclusion that there is a positive linkage between participation in international war and the levels of domestic political violence in participant countries. In the only study we know that deals directly with the question of whether participation in international war affects political repression, Rasler (1986) focused on the twentiethcentury United States and found evidence that administrations did indeed increase levels of repression during wars.
We hypothesize that such a relationship applies generally in our worldwide sample. As a guide to our coding of the concept war during the 1980s we used as a guideline the criteria developed by Small and Singer (1982) . These researchers coded a country as having been a participant in an interstate war when (1) there was a total of a thousand or more battle deaths suffered by all of the participants in the conflict, (2) the particular country suffered at least a hundred fatalities or had a thousand or more personnel taking part in the hostilities (pp. 50, 55). We ignored a further criterion employed by the Small and Singer study-that a participant country should be a member of the "international system" (p. 51)-because it did not fit well with the purposes of this cross-national study, which includes countries regardless of whether they are members of the international system as defined by Small and Singer.
Civil War Experience
Just as governments may employ repression when threatened on the international front, it is also a tool commonly used by governments that are faced with internal problems (see Nieburg 1969; Skocpol 1979;  Tilly 1978). -The most serious of threats in the domestic arena is posed by a condition of civil war, in which the authority of the regime in power is being challenged by an armed and organized resistance controlled by a shadow government. Therefore we shall propose a hypothesis that to our surprise had not yet been tested in quantitative studies of human rights and state terrorism-that regimes are more coercive when they are involved in civil conflict.26
In order to operationalize the concept of civil war we again look to the criteria developed in conjunction with the Small and Singer (1982) study for guidance. First, the government, as the central authority in a country, must be involved as a direct participant in the war. Second, there must be an effective resistance, that is, either both sides must be "organized for violent conflict" or "the weaker side, although initially unprepared [must be] able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains" (p. 215).27 Thus genocides and massacres are not considered to be civil wars, and this concept is kept distinct from our dependent variable.
TESTING A MODEL OF ABUSE OF PERSONAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS
In recent years studies employing the pooled crosssectional time-series (PCT) design have appeared much more frequently in political science journals. The PCT design is especially appealing because it enables researchers to test theories over both space and time simultaneously and thus to witness the interplay of two dimensions usually viewed separately in either cross-sectional or time-series studies (Clarke 1992; Sayrs 1989; Stimson 1985) . With this notable advantage, however, comes some statistical difficulties. Specifically, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity often complicate efforts to apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, probably the discipline's most widely used and understood statistical technique, on PCT data. Both autocorrelation (also known as serial correlation) and heteroscedasticity may lead to inaccurate estimates of the standard errors of parameter estimates, thus calling into question the results of significance tests (Ostrom 1990; Stimson 1985 should not, however, be interpreted as being evidence that this variable has a smaller effect, since that variable is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 46.4, as compared to the Freedom House variable which ranges from 1 to 7. In fact, when one considers the different scales of these two indicators, the coefficient of the Vanhanen scale is somewhat stronger than that of the Freedom House variable. We find that if a country were to achieve the least democratic score on the Vanhanen measure after having achieved the most democratic score in the previous time period, this would make a difference of about .4 in the dependent variable at time,. While the initial impact is moderate, we can see after performing some simple calculations, considering the dynamic effect mediated by the lagged dependent variable, that the impact of a loss of democracy increases substantially over time.32 Figure 1 shows that if the abandonment of the democratic process in our example country were to continue, other factors held equal, the human rights index would have increased by about 1.3 (on the five-point state repression scale) after five years, (i.e., at time + 5) as a result of the lagged effect, stabilizing at 1.4 points greater than the original score a few lags thereafter. The movement from most democratic to least democratic on the Freedom House measure is associated with a .26 increase in the Amnesty index, at time, stabilizing at about a one-point rise in that index after several lags.
Relating these effects back to the scale of the dependent variable, if a democratic country with a near perfect human rights record were suddenly to abandon the democratic process, we would expect that the country would, at the very least, begin to hold some political prisoners, and that political brutality, executions, and murders might become a com- In contrast, the sizes of the coefficients are probably rather unimportant from the perspective of those seeking to conduct policy-relevant research, who would probably focus on changes in the dependent variable that result from achievable changes in the values of manipulable independent variables. When we examine the differences in repression that result from the addition or subtraction of population from countries of various sizes, the impacts seem rather small. For example, the impact of adding one million people to a population the size of China's in year t would result in an increase of less than .0002 in the repression index at time + 10, in both sets of analyses. In the unlikely event that one million people were added to a country about the size of the Bahamas, certeris paribus, the increase in the repression index would only be around .3 at time + 10, regardless of which measure of democracy we might use.
We find no support for the conclusion reached by Henderson (1993) that rapid rates of increase in population lead to political repression. In the set of analyses utilizing the Freedom House democracy variable (model 1), a weak and statistically insignificant positive coefficient is the result, while in the second set of analyses, using the Vanhanen democracy variable (model 2), the coefficient is weak, statistically insignificant, and negative.
The results yielded by these analyses are also mixed with regard to the effects of economic variables on national propensities toward the violation of personal integrity rights. The hypothesis linking economic growth rates to repression is not supported by the results of either model 1 or model 2. Our findings do indicate that economic standing, as measured by per capita GNP, has a statistically significant effect on such violations in model 1 and falls just short of statistical significance in model 2. But here an examination of the magnitude of the coefficient leads us to the conclusion that the effect is rather weak, since the coefficients indicate that a relatively unlikely increase of ten thousand dollars in a country's per capita GNP from one year to the next would translate into a rather small decrease in the tendency for abuse of personal integrity of between .07 and .08 on the five-point human rights abuse index, ceteris paribus. If that country's per capita GNP remained stable at ten thousand dollars above the original value, this If one optimistically assumes for the world's poorest country at time a GNP per capita increase of one thousand dollars per year for a period of time long enough to make the income of that poorest country equal that of the richest country at time, the projections are those represented in Figure 2 . They show that after the 28 years this change would require, the decrease in repression due to such an impressive advance in economic standing would be expected to range from about .7 or .8, depending upon the measure of democracy used, with the personal integrity abuse index derived from Amnesty International reports. These truly long-term effects would represent important decreases in repression, in the unlikely event that a nation could sustain such increases in economic development. Nevertheless, they are much less impressive when compared with the shortterm effects of the loss of democracy or the onset of civil or international war.
The variables identifying particular types of regimes thought to have an important impact on levels of repression do not fare too well in these analyses.
While the military control variable has coefficients in the expected direction, they are statistically insignificant. And the variable identifying leftist regimes achieves a statistically insignificant coefficient in an unexpected direction.
In contrast, the dummy variables identifying levels of external and internal threat, in the form of international and civil wars, do achieve substantively important and statistically significant coefficients, indicating that as threat increases, so does a country's propensity to use repression. The variable identifying participants in ongoing international wars achieves statistically significant coefficients of .21 and .22 in models 1 and 2, respectively. These coefficients indicate that if a country were to be involved in international war for six consecutive years, we would expect an increase of about .7 in the human rights index, other factors held constant, in the sixth year (see The results in models 3 and 4 are very similar to those yielded when the focus was on the dependent variable generated from Amnesty International reports. The most serious divergence between this and the first set of results is that relating to the leftist government variable, which achieves strong, statistically significant coefficients in the expected direction. In our previous analyses, focusing on an index derived from Amnesty International reports, the coefficients had been extremely weak, with a negative By way of contrast, even the strongest plausible projections based on the effects of economic standing and population size seem weak when compared to the effects of the democracy and international and civil war. Generously plausible assumptions about changes in population size yield at best only modest increases in predicted abuse of personal integrity right, ceteris paribus, when projected over time. Similarly, the most optimistic estimate of economic standing's effect is that an increase of ten thousand dollars in per capita GNP, held constant for several years thereafter, years would decrease state terrorism by .15 at time, by .39, at time + 5, stabilizing at .42 a few lags thereafter. So even though these analyses do show that economic development makes a statistically significant difference in propensities to use state terror, the size of that difference is rather small. On the other hand, given the long research tradition that has found strong correlations between economic development and democracy,35 it is notable that both economic development and democracy have statistically significant effects on repression of personal integrity rights, regardless of the magnitudes of their impacts.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we sought to explain variations in cross-national respect for the subset of human rights known as personal integrity rights, through the use of sophisticated multivariate methods, on a comprehensive pooled cross-sectional data set covering the years 1980-87. A model explaining variations in national respect for these rights was constructed to test several hypotheses drawn from a variety of theoretical perspectives on why such human rights violations might occur. Two distinct dependent variables, derived from information on human rights conditions provided by Amnesty International and the U.S. Department, and two indicators of the key concept of democracy were used in four sets of analyses. Because the tenor of the findings yielded by the four models is very similar, we can conclude with some confidence that the effects we isolated are in fact an accurate representation of reality. Several of our hypotheses were supported in each of the four sets of analyses that we presented. As expected, democracy was shown to be associated with a decreased incidence in repression, regardless of which of the two indicators of that concept-and which of the two dependent variables-was employed. These results are important because they substantially extend the findings of Henderson (1991 Henderson ( , 1993 with different measurements of democracy. As a result of the cumulation of findings on this linkage, then, it would now seem difficult to deny that democratization decreases governments' use of coercion to abuse the human rights of private citizens.
Following Henderson (1993), two population variable were employed in our multivariate model of human rights abuse. With regard to the logged population size variable, the results were stable and quite clear, and we can therefore conclude that population size does have a positive impact on human rights abuse, with more populated countries having a greater propensity to abuse personal integrity rights, ceteris paribus.
Our findings regarding several other variables thought to be related to state terror were negative. None of our results supported the conclusion that military control or British cultural influence affects levels of repression.36 Results for the effects of population growth were stable across all of the analyses that were conducted, indicating no statistically significant or substantively important impact on repression. This finding contradicts the conclusions of Henderson (1993), which he based on his analysis of a cross-sectional data set covering the year of 1985. However, here we should note that we dealt with only a seven-year time frame and that the population increase variable utilized in this study was an average of the population gain over this seven-year period, so that unlike other variables in the model (with the exception of British cultural influence), it did not vary across time. A study using accurate yearly estimates (if such estimates are possible) conducted over a longer time frame might yield more positive results.
Rather mixed results were yielded by the variable identifying leftist governments. Leftist regimes appeared to violate personal integrity rights more seriously than others when such rights were operationalized using information gathered from U.S. State Department sources. When our analysis focused on the measure derived from Amnesty International information, however, no such relationship appeared. Here we are inclined to give less weight to the results obtained with the index derived from State Department reports, because our findings are consistent with those that would be expected if allegations regarding the biases of the State Department reports against (or of Amnesty International in favor of) some leftist regimes are valid (e.g., Innes 1992). Thus we cannot conclude that, ceteris paribus, doctrinaire socialism is a cause of coercion that abuses human rights; but the results do perhaps provide limited empirical evidence of the different "pictures" of human rights realities painted by these two sources of human rights behavior during the 1980s.
Our study does provide very firm support for the hypotheses linking national experience of international and domestic threats, in the form of international and civil wars, to an increased tendency to abuse personal integrity rights. Variables identifying countries that were participants in both kinds of wars were found to have statistically significant and substantively important impacts on national respect for the personal integrity of citizens in each of the four sets of analyses, with civil war participation having a somewhat larger impact than participation in international war. Thus this study is the first to document the impact of involvement in violent conflicts, in both the international and domestic arenas, on levels of repression around the world.
Finally, with regard to economic explanations of human rights, abuse, we found in each of our four sets of analyses that economic standing is negatively, but only rather weakly, related to regimes' propensities to abuse of personal integrity rights. Having now nearly finished this investigation of the conditions that lead to the most serious forms of human rights abuse, we believe we would be remiss if we failed to consider the vitally important question of what we have learned that might be helpful to scholars and practitioners hoping to decrease abuses of personal integrity worldwide. While our primary focus in this study has been on theory, our findings do speak to issues of interest to practitioners. If governments, international organizations, and subnational actors are interested in improving respect for personal integrity around the world, one way for these actors to make headway toward this goal is, not surprisingly, to promote democracy. Promoting democracy is clearly not the entire answer, however. Our results indicate that if a nondemocratic country known to be a very serious violator of personal integrity rights were to change to a democratic form of government, human rights abuse would probably not disappear completely, other factors being equal. Neither should economic development be viewed as the panacea. Efforts to improve economic conditions within a country through programs like foreign aid might at times successfully promote human rights, defined more broadly, by leading to the provision for basic human needs, but our study indicates these conditions have, at best, a moderate impact on respect for personal integrity. Neither would population control efforts be likely to have a substantively important impact on repression of these rights.
Our findings do, however, reveal another course toward greater respect of personal integrity, one that would have an impact of about the same magnitude as converting autocratic regimes to democratic ones. We have shown that these basic rights can be enhanced by actors who would encourage countries to solve their political conflicts short of war, and use whatever means are at their disposal to assist them in doing so.
APPENDIX
In order to add to the already extensive data set gathered by Stohl and his colleagues (n.d.), Sirirangsi (1993, 1994) After compiling the scores, the coders found that disagreements often occurred on three kinds of cases. First, there were cases that were categorized as a 2 by one coder and as a 3 by the other. These tended to be countries in which there was limited political imprisonment but considerable alleged torture or in which there was more torture than would ordinarily be indicated by the wording for the 2 category. A second kind of disagreement occurred on cases in which prisoners were taken after alleged demonstrations, riots, or revolution attempts but with uncertainty over whether their political activity was violent or not. Since a major concern was to make our data comparable to those gathered for use in the Stohl study, we consulted those researchers to see how they had dealt with these cases. A telephone conversation with Mark Gibney (February 1991) confirmed that those researchers gave the benefit of the doubt to the government, following the dictate that they should be "innocent until proven guilty." To remain consistent with the data provided by these researchers, we, too, followed this decision rule.
A third type of case on which coders tended to disagree involved countries that imprisoned conscientious objectors identified by Amnesty International as "prisoners of conscience." In such cases, according to Gibney, countries with large numbers of imprisoned conscientious objectors were coded as being in the 2 category as long as other human rights difficulties did not exist, but those that had only one or two such prisoners were coded as being in the 1 category. Again, following the practice of these researchers, most of these disagreements were resolved through discussion and reconsideration of the facts of the particular cases. But if no resolution was in sight, again following the practice described by Gibney, a third coder was brought in to cast the deciding judgment. Stohl and his colleagues (1986) cite major problems with this approach. First, the different repressive behaviors counted are often substitutable means used to reach the same end-the repression of those who are thought to pose an obstacle to the policies or continued power of the incumbent regime. For example, a decrease in reports of politically motivated arrests by a government might not be an accurate indicator of improving human rights if that decrease takes place soon after several hundred opponents of the government were executed. Second, since reports of human rights abuses are routinely suppressed by closed regimes to an extent that would not be possible in more open societies, events data measures sometimes lead to counterintuitive and invalid findings, like that reported by Stohl and colleagues indicating that the United States was a more repressive society in the years 1948-50 than the Soviet Union under Stalin. We therefore are in strong agreement with the pleas of Stohl and colleagues, who argue that "we must bring political knowledge to bear in shaping our collection of information and measurement schemes" (p. 598). So while events data may provide a useful supplement to the approach we take in this.research, we choose not to use it primarily for the reasons just rehearsed. In addition, the events data we would need to operationalize our dependent variables are simply not currently available and our comprehensive international sample for our time period. Accordingly, we see a standard-based approach as the best available measurement alternative at this time. An advantage of this approach is that it allows for a greater degree of political knowledge to be used in the development and application of standards to sources of human rights information specified by the researchers. Further, such measurement techniques allow us to focus clearly on the integrity-of-theperson rights in which we are most interested in this study.
Notes
7. The ratings were derived from country profiles included in the Amnesty International Reports for 1981-88 and the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981-88.
8. In coding the Amnesty International profiles, the least repressive coding of 1 was assigned in only 71 cases for 1980-87, compared to 376 cases for the State Department reports. But there was little difference between the two in the number of cases their reports led us to place in the four higher categories. Further, of the 302 cases that were missing in Amnesty International, we gave 220 codes of 1 in our ratings derived from the State Department reports. Therefore, while Amnesty insists that the "omission of a country entry should not be interpreted as indicating that no human rights violations took place in that country" (Amnesty International 1987, 2), in practice, those countries that were omitted from the Amnesty International reports tended to be (but were not always) countries that appeared to adhere to the rule of law.
9. An issue of special concern to us are allegations of bias against the State Department reports (e.g., Carleton and Stohl 1987 and the sources cited therein). However, it is also important to note that some argue that the consistency of the U.S. State Department reports improved during the 1980s and therefore may be more valid in that period than they had been previously (e.g., Innes 1992). Furthermore, if some have argued that the State Department has been biased against leftist regimes, others have suggested that Amnesty International may have been more likely to note abuses by governments against armed leftist oppositions than by those oppositions against government and its supporters.
10. Closely related to these arguments are those of Howard and Donnelly (tested in the Mitchell and McCormick study) that "internationally recognized human rights require a liberal regime" because such regimes give the individual priority over the state (1986, 802). Since liberal regimes clearly fall into the subclass democracy as that term is conventionally defined, we see no reason to represent them separately in our analysis.
11. For example, the preface to a recent "worldwide survey" of democracy, notes that "humanitarian concern for human rights is inseparable from . .. democracy or the lack of it. Human rights are part, a good part, of democracy, and they can be assured only by legal, responsible, that is, democratic governments-at the same time affirming that "the question of democracy is broader" than the question of the status of human rights as typically assessed by Amnesty International, the State Department, and Freedom House (Wesson 1987, vii) .
12. Bollen (1980) went on to create a variable based on his definitions, covering the years 1960 and 1965. Unfortunately, the measure has not been replicated on an annual basis and thus cannot be used in this study. For further discussion, see Bollen 1990 Bollen , 1993 13. The Polity II operationalization of institutional democracy omits any consideration of whether a regime respects the dignity of the person, which makes it an ideal measure for our purposes. Unfortunately, the Polity II measure is available only through the year 1986 and for only 127 of the maximum of 153 nations for which we have measures of state terrorism and our other independent variables. Since we lacked the time and resources to expand the Polity II democracy data to cover 1987 for all nations and 1980-86 for 26 additional nations, using Gurr's democracy index would have substantially reduced the N for our pooled analysis, so we explored other alternatives. However, analyses conducted with the Polity II measure on this reduced sample led us to conclusions similar to those reached in the analyses we shall present. The former are not presented in more detail due to space limitations. 17. These freedoms and others are a part of the Freedom House civil liberties rating. However, the civil liberties rating is not a viable measure of democracy for our use because it specifically includes "protection from unjustified political terror, imprisonment, exile or torture," which overlaps clearly with the indicators derived from the Amnesty International and State Department reports, which are our dependent variables, as well as a number of other rights that are not essential to democracy as envisioned by Bollen (1990, 20-21) . Perhaps because the Freedom House civil rights indicator includes basic civil liberties that are a part of many definitions of democracy, the overall correlation between the political and civil rights ratings in our data set is very high, .935. Nevertheless, the conceptual differences between the two indicators and the explicit overlap of the civil liberties indicator with repression convinces us to consider only the political liberties rating as our measure of democracy.
A summary collection of values for this variable is reported in
18. This was also noted by Gurr. In contrasting the Polity II indicators with the Freedom House measures, Gurr noted that "the problem with the latter is that Gastil assigned annual scores partly on the basis of repression" (personal communication, 15 September 1992).
19. Bollen's (1993) article appeared too late for us to take full account of his findings and his measurement suggestions in our analysis. But we should note that despite his conclusion about the superior validity of the Freedom House measure, Bollen does not endorse the use of a single indicator. Instead, he suggests using structural equation models to construct indicators that maximize validity while minimizing systematic and random measurement error. Unfortunately, he also notes that techniques appropriate for dealing with "pooled cross-sectional and time series data for nations" are "underdeveloped in latent variable models" (p. 1224). As a secondary strategy, he suggests using factor scores from several indicators as a composite measure of democracy. We might have adopted this approach but did not because (1) the data required to construct the composite index ultimately recommended by Bollen were not available to us in appropriate time series form prior to our completion of our analyses and (2) . 3) in analyses using the Vanhanen measure of democracy. So perhaps this hypothesis should not be dismissed completely at this point. Other results yielded by these analyses were very similar in terms of the variables that reached statistical significance, with the exception of the international war variable, which failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance in analyses with the dependent variable derived from Amnesty International profiles, but did achieve statistically significant coefficients of around .5 in the analyses based on ratings generated from the State Department reports. These analyses are not presented in more detail because of space limitations and because the findings are generally similar. We decided to present the OLS analyses with the lagged dependent variable because it is a more widely understood method, because of the ease in calculating the lagged effects of independent variables, and because the results were more consistent from one set of analyses to another. The results of the AR(1) models described here are available upon request from the authors.
